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THE PRICE LEVEL, RELATIVE PRICES, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY:
ASPECTS OF THE INTER-WAR DEBATE*

by

David Laidler
(Bank of Montreal Professor, University of Western Ontario)
Abstract: Recent financial instability has called into question the sufficiency of low inflation as a
goal for monetary policy. This paper discusses inter-war literature bearing on this question. It
begins with theories of the cycle based on the quantity theory, and their policy prescription of
price stability supported by lender of last resort activities in the event of crises, arguing that their
neglect of fluctuations in investment was a weakness. Other approaches are then taken up,
particularly Austrian theory which stressed the banking system’s capacity to generate relative
price distortions and forced saving. This theory was discredited by its association with nihilistic
policy prescriptions during the Great Depression. Nevertheless, its core insights were
worthwhile, and also played an important part in Robertson’s more eclectic account of the cycle.
The latter, however, yielded activist policy prescriptions of a sort that were discredited in the
post-war period. Whether these now need re-examination, or whether a low inflation regime, in
which the authorities stand ready to resort to vigorous monetary expansion in the aftermath of
asset market problems, is adequate to maintain economic stability is still an open question.

*Paper presented on March 28, 2003 at a conference on “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability,
and the Business Cycle” at the Bank for International Settlements” Basel, Switzerland. I am
grateful to Bill White and Claudio Borio for suggesting that I write this paper, to them, as well as
Jeff Amato, Joe Bisignano, Andy Filardo and Gabriele Galati, for many interesting discussions
of its contents, and to the BIS for providing the congenial environment where much preliminary
work on it was done. Claudio Borio also subsequently provided extremely helpful comments on
a first complete draft of this essay, as did Roger Garrison, and Roger Sandilands. This version of
the paper has benefited from discussions with Olivier Blanchard and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, who
acted a formal discussants at the conference, and also from Barry Eichengreen.
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Low Inflation and Economic Stability
The 1990s saw low and stable inflation in many countries. It turned out, however, that, in and of
itself, this was not a sufficient condition for financial stability more broadly defined, nor for
stability in the real economy. To be sure, the most dramatic problems, those experienced in Asia
during 1997-98, or Argentina in 2001, arose in economies where low inflation had been held in
place by exchange rate pegs - more or less formal, depending upon the specific economy - that
proved unsustainable, and this was hardly a novel occurrence. Furthermore, asset market
problems and subsequent slowdowns in real activity have frequently been associated with
contractionary monetary policy designed to bring general inflationary pressures, themselves the
visible consequences of earlier monetary over-expansion, under control. For an example here, we
need look no further than the late 1980s, when general economic expansion and incipient upward
pressure on inflation were accompanied in an number of countries by bubbles in real estate
markets, whose subsequent collapse was one of the most visible features of the recession with
which that decade ended.

Policy Issues, Now and Then
But, even at the end of the 1980s, real estate bubbles occurred in some economies without being
accompanied by any obvious general inflationary pressures. The Nordic countries provide a
notable example here. Furthermore, the high-tech bubble that shocked North American and
European markets in the late 1990s occurred in markets where monetary policy was aimed at
domestic goals and inflation remained low. It also had consequences well beyond financial
markets, involving as it did considerable over-investment in computing and communications
equipment of all sorts. And in its aftermath, there are fears in a number of countries that bubbles
are now developing in markets for domestic real estate, not least in the United Kingdom.
This experience at the very least raises questions about the adequacy of low inflation as a
sufficient goal for monetary policy, whether pursued in the context of formal inflation targets,
which, beginning with New Zealand and Canada, were adopted by an increasing number of
countries in the 1990s, or less formally, as in the case of Japan in the 1980s or the United States
in the 1990s. Perhaps economic performance might be better if, instead of focussing only on the
behaviour of the general price level, monetary policy also pays attention to countering rapid
increases in asset prices, even those occurring while, overall, inflation remains well under
control.
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Questions bearing on this issue were much analysed by economists before the Keynesian
Revolution, and in this essay I shall discuss some highlights of the literature that their debates
generated.1 In those years, a body of theory dealing with fluctuations that took the influence of
monetary factors on the general price level as its starting point vied with others that stressed
monetary effects on relative prices, and on asset prices in particular, and yet others that
downplayed the role of the monetary system in generating the cycle. These competing views
yielded sometimes contradictory positions on the sufficiency of price level stability in particular,
and even monetary measures in general, as a means of avoiding fluctuations. There are,
nevertheless, certain important differences between the policy problems and approaches of the
inter-war years and those which dominate present day debates, and these have influenced my
choice of topics to be discussed below.
To begin with, policies aimed at domestic goals, such as low inflation, or economic
stability more generally, are nowadays self-consciously implemented against a background of
exchange rate flexibility. In the inter-war years, matters were not so clear cut, and international
monetary considerations were never too far in the background. But interwar macroeconomic
theory nevertheless did have a good deal to say that can be applied to illuminating the policy
choices that nowadays face monetary authorities that have already opted to pursue domestic
goals. I shall emphasise these aspects of the literature in what follows. As a corollary, I shall
have relatively little to say about how it treated international monetary arrangements, notably the
gold standard, which were matters of central policy importance in many countries in the 1920s
and 1930s, and therefore were extensively discussed.2
Furthermore, present day economics largely takes it for granted that activity in the real
economy is well co-ordinated by market mechanisms, and as a result, discussions tend to focus
on instability within the financial system. The economic theory of the inter-war years, on the
other hand, took very seriously the possibility that the real economy was subject to chronic coordination failures, particularly as far as the allocation of resources over time was concerned. It
therefore paid considerable attention to fluctuations in investment and imbalances in the capital
stock, and by and large treated financial instability, not as a problem in and of itself, but as a
reflection of these deeper phenomena. In this case, I have chosen to follow the emphasis of these
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In what follows, I draw on my own earlier work on this material, in particular, Laidler (1999)
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Bernard and Bisignano (2002) provide an account of interwar debates that is in many respects complimentary to
this one, inasmuch as it pays particular attention to international monetary factors as sources of domestic policy
problems, both then and more recently.
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earlier discussions, because I believe that there are perhaps a few valuable insights into modern
policy problems that the later literature has been inclined to neglect.

An Outline of the Paper
This paper begins with an account of theories of the cycle and stabilisation policy that started
from the quantity theory of money. These are the direct intellectual ancestors of the modern view
that monetary policy should be aimed at maintaining low and stable inflation. Their exponents
argued that stabilisation of the general price level was not only the right goal for monetary
policy, but one whose successful pursuit would, in an of itself, eliminate, or at least markedly
reduce, the likelihood of real instability. But some of these exponents, particularly those who
favoured discretionary rather than rule-bound monetary policy, were also strong advocates of the
monetary authorities making rapid and vigorous use of their lender-of-last-resort powers should
things nevertheless go wrong, as of course they did, with a vengeance in 1929.
Accounting for the stylised facts about fluctuations in investment has always been an
awkward corner for traditional monetary accounts of the cycle. In what follows, therefore, some
brief comments on attempts by Cambridge economists to extend the traditional monetary theory
of the cycle to deal with these facts will precede discussion of an alternative real tradition in
cycle theory, Marxist in origin, that faces them squarely, and indeed takes their explanation as
the being the central goal of cycle theory. Many inter-war cycle theorists were acutely aware of
the challenge that this Marxist tradition posed, and a selection of their responses to it will then be
examined.
Here, I shall begin with Austrian theory, which self-consciously defended the neo-classical
vision of a stable market economy against the Socialist critique. This theory stressed the role of
the monetary system in creating, not fluctuations in the general price level, but distortions in
relative prices that led directly to destabilising imbalances in the structure of the capital stock. It
will be argued that, though this specific theory’s logical structure was deeply flawed, the
phenomenon to which it drew attention, forced saving, has considerable appeal as one possible
means of explaining how asset market imbalances can arise against the background of stable
prices. However, as will also be shown, when Dennis Robertson incorporated forced saving into
a more eclectic framework than the neo-classical general equilibrium approach adopted by the
Austrians, his overall analysis led him to join other Cambridge economists in recommending
exactly the kind of policy regime whose collapse in the 1970s and 1980s provides the
background for current pre-occupations with confining monetary policy to the pursuit of low and
stable inflation, and denying any significant stabilising role to fiscal policy.
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In conclusion, it will be suggested that experience in the aftermath of the recent high-tech
bubble might well provide evidence that will help us to decide whether we need to re-examine
recommendations such as those of Robertson, or whether the quantity theory inspired advocates
of discretionary monetary policy were right that a speedy deployment of the central bank’s
powers to create liquidity is adequate to cope with the consequences of crises that arise under
monetary policy regimes that are aimed at low and stable inflation..

The Quantity Theory Tradition in Cycle Theory
The Quantity Theory of Money had its modern origins in the great gold inflation that marked the
16th and 17th centuries. It was, and remains, in the first instance, a theory about the relationship
between the quantity of money and the price level, which in its most basic formulation has it that
causation runs from money to prices, rather than in the opposite direction, and that the price level
will move in proportion to money, provided that velocity and real output are assumed to be
constant. Since the first half of the 19th century, however, a particular extension of the quantity
theory tradition has emphasised the potential for interactions between the supply and demand for
money to create systematic fluctuations in the price level, and/or the aggregate demand for goods
and services, which in turn seem to be central features of what was once called the credit cycle,
but which is nowadays more usually referred to as the business cycle.
This approach lays particular stress on recursive patterns of two-way causation that link
the price level and the quantity of money within the cycle, a feature which distinguishes it
sharply from the quantity theory itself, and which has prompted some commentators to refer to it
as quantity theoretic, rather than to characterise it as a straightforward application of the quantity
theory. Even though this approach to the cycle has evolved over time, it displays considerable
continuity, from its first appearances in early 19th century debates about the workings of the
British monetary system, right down to the monetarism of the 1960s and 1970s which provided
many of the intellectual foundations for contemporary inflation-targeting regimes.

The 19th Century Background
Money Credit and Commerce (Marshall, 1923) was a work of its author’s old age, and was by no
means the most up-to-date work on monetary issues then available, but it would still have been
of more than antiquarian interest to its intended readers. There is no better evidence of the
essential continuity of earlier work on the quantity theoretic approach to the cycle than
Marshall’s exposition of it. He begins by quoting Samuel Jones Loyd’s (later Lord Overstone)
(1837) characterisation of the cycle: “It has been well said that “the state of trade revolves
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apparently in an established cycle. First we find it in a state of quiescence---next, improvement--growing confidence---prosperity--- excitement---overtrading---convulsion---pressure--stagnation---distress---ending again in quiescence” (p.243) and soon proceeds to an account of
“The ordinary course of a fluctuation in commercial credit” that relies heavily on a long passage
transcribed from Marshall and Marshall (1879, pp. 154-156), which in turn is clearly related to a
similar account given by John Stuart Mill in his Principles of Political Economy (1848, 1871,
pp. 542-543)
This particular account of the cycle is typical of the literature it represents. It is vague
about just what kind of disturbance might initially shift the economy from a state of quiescence
to improvement, but it emphasises that, once begun, economic expansion will be amplified by
the recursive interactions of expanding money and credit, rising prices, and the profits made by
borrowers. This expansion in turn will go on until “trade is in a dangerous condition” (1923,
p.250) and distrust that creates incentives for lenders to tighten credit begins to set in. Given the
precarious state of the market after a long bout of speculation, such tightening is sufficient to
persuade some speculators to begin selling their holdings of goods and set in motion a collapse
of prices.3 Thereafter, “As credit by growing makes itself grow, so when distrust has taken the
place of confidence, failure and panic breed panic and failure”(1923, p.250). The essential
features of the upswing and downswing of the cycle according to this monetary approach were,
then, rising and falling prices driven by cumulative expansions and contractions of credit and
bank money. Furthermore, the development of “overtrading” - what we would now call
speculative bubbles - was seen as an integral feature the final stages of the upswing, while its
collapse - the bursting of the bubbles in question - was a key characteristic of the onset of the
downswing.4
This vision led naturally to the view that policies capable of stabilising the cycle would
also eliminate speculative bubbles, not to mention their real consequences. From the very
beginning, the quantity theoretic literature contained an important strand that advocated legally
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In 19th century accounts of the cycle, the role of an adverse balance of payments in draining gold from the banking
system was often accorded an important role in precipitating a downturn. This matter is mentioned by neither Mill
nor Marshall in the passages referred to here, though both pay considerable attention to it elsewhere in their writings.
4

I know of no better evidence of this than a cartoon, probably drawn about 1857, of “the Overstone Cycle”,
reproduced in O’Brien (ed.) (1971). “Excitement” is depicted with bustle abound a building bearing the sign of the
“South Pole Warming Company”, and “Convulsion” with an exploding “Royal Bubble Bank”. I am grateful to Denis
O’Brien for advice about the date of this cartoon, and to Walter Eltis for first drawing my attention the significance
of its content.
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enforced monetary rules of one sort or another as a means of ensuring stability. Even by the
1830s, when Overstone wrote the description quoted by Marshall, it had become clear from
experience that the mere legal requirement that the liabilities of the banking system, or more
specifically of the Bank of England, be convertible on demand into gold, was not a sufficient rule
to eliminate cycles and their accompanying crises, and the Bank Charter Act of 1844, of which
Overstone was a major architect, attempted to solve this problem by tightening the legal
restrictions under which the Bank of England operated. The Act established the Bank’s note
issuing department as what we would now call a currency board, based on gold, in the
expectation that this would eliminate the monetary system’s capacity to generate the fluctuations
in money and credit that were necessary for the cycle to persist as a regular feature of economic
life. This rule too proved inadequate, however, as its Banking School opponents had predicted,
and as subsequent crises in 1847, 1853 and 1865 soon demonstrated, because its framers had
paid insufficient attention to the role of bank deposits, including Bank of England deposits, in the
monetary system.
By the 1870s, therefore, it was widely taken for granted that short-run discretionary policy
(though always conducted against the background of gold convertibility) was required to cope
with problems created by cycles. The policy envisaged, however, was not of the counter-cyclical
type that later came to be associated with the exercise of such discretion. Rather, the British
Monetary Orthodoxy, encapsulated in Walter Bagehot’s (1873) precepts for central banking,
recommended no more than that the Bank of England should always be ready to act as a lender
of last resort to any and all solvent institutions whose survival was threatened by the contagious
crises which had marked the upper turning point of cycles from 1825 onwards5. As it came to be
adopted in the last quarter of the 19th century, this orthodoxy was a considerable success in its
own terms. Gold convertibility was never in question, and though financial crises still occurred
from time to time, notably that created by the near failure of Baring Brothers in 1890, and fraud
aside, bank failures were a thing of the past in Britain from the 1870s onwards. This British
experience was well known to observers in the United States, where crises involving bank
failures were a regular feature of the financial landscape until 1907, and provided an important
impetus to the founding of the Federal Reserve system.6
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The italicised phrase is, of course, taken from the title of Frank Fetter’s still indispensable 1964 history of British
monetary economics over the years 1797-1875.
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For a n influential contemporary account of financial crises in the United States, and the effect that the absence of a
lender of last resort had on their course, see Sprague (1910)
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Price Stability as a Policy Goal
As I have argued in greater detail in Laidler (1991, 2002), even as Bagehot’s policy orthodoxy
was becoming established in central bank practice, developments in economic theory that would
ultimately render it obsolete were already getting under way. Marshall himself presented a key
refinement of the standard monetary account of the cycle in (1887). He linked the expansion and
contraction of money and credit to rising and falling prices by noting that nominal interest rates
failed fully to adjust to inflation and deflation, and, like Marshall and Marshall (1879), he
attributed variations in output and employment to counter-cyclical movements in real wages that
in turn were the result of the interaction of sticky nominal money wages with more flexible
output prices. Evidently, both of these sources of trouble could be avoided either by ensuring
price level stability or by linking debt and wage contracts to a suitable price index. Marshall in
fact recommended the latter, but this proposal got nowhere in practice.7 In the longer run,
however, his 1887 work remained important because it provided arguments implying that price
level stabilization was the key to achieving more general financial and economic stability.
Even before the outbreak of World War 1, Irving Fisher, who was well aware of Marshall’s
contribution, began to advocate his “compensated dollar” scheme as a means of automatically
stabilising prices, and to campaign for legislation that would subject the newly founded Federal
Reserve system to a legislated price stability rule. Since the cycle was, in Fisher’s eyes, largely a
“dance of the dollar”, he confidently expected that the enactment and observance of such a rule
would eliminate it.8 This campaign continued with varying degrees of intensity, though no
legislative success, throughout the 1920s, and Henry Simons preserved its basic message in a
now classic 1936 paper, which would be much cited in post-war monetarist literature.
In the inter-war years, however, legislated monetary policy rules were a minority taste, as
indeed they are now. Even by the mid-1920s, European economies were already facing what
seemed to be unprecedented policy problems of apparently secular stagnation and mass
unemployment created by botched attempts to restore the Gold Standard after the end of World-
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It seems to have been Jevons (1875) who first suggested indexation, but only for credit market contracts. Marshall
extended the proposal to the labour market.
8

The “compensated dollar” involved varying the gold content of the dollar to offset changes in the price of gold
relative to a general price index. It seems to have been first discussed as a logical possibility in a footnote in
Marshall (1887). Initially, Fisher proposed to have this scheme imposed upon the Federal Reserve system , but it was
dropped from his later campaigns for a price stability rule.
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War-1, and discussions of counter-cyclical monetary policy seemed barely relevant in this
context. Even in the United States, where, before 1929, the debate was dominated by more
traditional questions, discretionary stabilization policy, “credit control” as it was usually called,
attracted more support, than did legislated rules, while advocates of both found themselves in an
ongoing debate with exponents of Banking School ideas inherited from 19th century Britain.

Hawtrey on 1928-1932
The case for discretionary policy aimed at stabilising prices, and hence the cycle, has roots in the
late 19th century literature, where an early and eloquent case for using discount rate policy for
this purpose was made by the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell as early as 1898. As Thomas
Humphrey (2002) has recently reminded us, Wicksell’s positive analysis of inflation was taken
up (without acknowledgement) by Gustav Cassel (eg. 1928). However, Wicksell derived his
proposals from a theory of secular inflation, not of the cycle, and Cassel’s variation on his theme
was deployed in the course of, and probably in support of, one of Fisher’s campaigns for
subjecting the Federal Reserve system to a price-stability rule.9 In the 1920s, the best known
exponent of the quantity theoretic approach to cycle theory, and of the discretionary stabilisation
policy that it seemed to support, was Ralph Hawtrey, an official of the UK Treasury. His works
were widely read in the United States, and greatly admired too, not least by Allyn Young of
Harvard, probably the most influential teacher of monetary economics in the country at that
time.10
In Hawtrey’s view, the cycle resulted from what he called the “inherent instability of
credit” which arose from essentially the same interest rate mechanism that Marshall had
identified in 1887, although he laid more stress on the role played in that mechanism by inflation
expectations in his first (1913) exposition of it than in subsequent accounts. To this he added,
first of all, an analysis of the endogenous cyclical behaviour of what we would now call the
public’s currency deposit ratio that ensured that an internal drain (inflow) of cash from (into) the
banks’ reserves that came late in the upswing (downswing) would curtail (enhance) their
willingness to lend, hence precipitating the cycle’s turning points. And second, he proposed a
different role for wage stickiness in the cycle. Where Marshall had sticky wages interacting with
9

For documentation of Cassel’s support of price stability legislation in the United States in 1928, see Charles
Hardy’s discussion of this episode in (1932, pp. 199-206)
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I have given an account of Hawtrey’s views in Laidler (1999, pp.112-128). For a recent discussion of his influence
on Young, and of Young’s own views, see Mehrling (1996, 1997).
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flexible prices to produce perverse fluctuations in real wages, Hawtrey saw their main role as
being to induce stickiness into price level behaviour by way of a mark-up mechanism, hence
making output, rather than the price level, the variable that adjusted to variations in the money
supply and, in turn, provoked further variations in the latter.
According to Hawtrey, even under an international gold standard, the cycle could in
principle be ironed out by the judicious use of discount rate policy on the part of central banks
acting in concert, though, to his credit, he doubted the practical feasibility of doing so
completely. Nevertheless he believed that stabilisation policy, even imperfectly executed, could
improve matters, and, as early as (1913), he entertained the logical possibility of an individual
central bank attempting such a policy under a flexible exchange rate. The Federal Reserve
system’s cautious attempts during the 1920s at “credit control”, when the scale of US gold
holdings insulated domestic monetary policy from any international constraints, were very much
along the lines that he, as well as Young and others under his influence, advocated.
As we now know, despite the Fed’s success in maintaining a non-inflationary environment
in the 1920s, an asset market bubble developed whose collapse in October 1929 ushered in the
Great Depression. Hawtrey’s (1932) essay on The Art of Central Banking, written in the
aftermath of these events, throws light on the general question of whether price level stability is a
sufficient indicator of the success of monetary policy, and discusses in some detail how a central
bank should respond to a collapsed asset market bubble.
One important feature of the traditional monetary theory of the cycle was clearly
discredited by the events of the 1920s: namely, that theory’s presumption that the swelling of a
speculative bubble in asset markets required a prior period of general price level inflation driven
by the over- expansion of bank credit and money to bring it about. Hawtrey (1932) himself
conceded as much when he asserted explicitly that “the speculation which trebled the average
market values of shares in the American market between 1923 and 1929 was not due to
inflation”, and, consistent with this view, he did not blame the market’s collapse in October 1929
for the severe reduction in aggregate demand that followed.
“That spending power did shrink is beyond dispute, but the cause was not the Wall
Street crisis. The shrinkage of spending power and the Wall Street crisis were both the
effects of a common cause, the credit contraction towards which the Federal Reserve
System and the Bank of England had been directing their combined efforts. The Wall
Street crisis only intensified the depression through its psychological effects.” (p. 80)
Here, it is worth noting explicitly that, in the case of the U.S., the Fed’s tightening of policy had
been intended to damp down speculative tendencies that were developing in the economy even
against a background of overall price level stability, and that some contemporary commentators,
10

for example, Lauchlin Currie (1931) who was Young’s student, and also Hawtrey’s assistant
during the latter’s visit to Harvard in 1928-29, not to mention later ones such as Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) have suggested that the reduction in money growth this attempt brought about
may in turn have been responsible for the downturn in real activity that began in the summer of
1929.11
After the crash, according to Hawtrey (1932), the Fed’s efforts to counter the economy’s
contraction had been inadequate. Interest rates did fall, “but the process was deplorably slow”
(p.213), while the open market operations undertaken in 1930 were “half-hearted”, so much so
that, by the middle of 1930, what Hawtrey usually termed a “credit deadlock” had developed.
Such a deadlock was a state of affairs in which there was a general reluctance on the part of the
business community to borrow from the banking system on any terms offered. “When that
happens, it seems to be the extreme of paradox to say that there is a shortage of money. . .”
(p.172) but that was indeed what ailed the economy. For Hawtrey, “The Central Bank is the
lender of last resort. That is the true source of its responsibility for the currency” (p.116,
Hawtrey’s italics), and “The essential duty of the central bank as the lender of last resort is to
make good a shortage of cash among the competitive banks.” (p.126) Therefore, what was
always required in the face of a credit deadlock was open market purchases of securities on
whatever scale was needed to bring about a resumption of spending by the public.12
Two points should be made about Hawtrey’s credit deadlock concept. First, it must not be
confused with the liquidity trap doctrine, which sees a high, and in the limit infinite, interest
elasticity of demand for money as an obstacle to effective monetary policy, rather than a low, and
in the limit zero, interest elasticity of demand for credit.13 Second it also differs from the
11

Currie’s 1931 Ph. D thesis, referred to here, was heavily influenced by Hawtrey’s ideas. On this, See Laidler
(1999, pp. 233-236)
12

It is worth noting explicitly that there are two elements to the lender of last resort doctrine in 19th century
discussions, as Humphrey and Keleher (1985) have carefully documented. The first stresses the central bank’s role
as a provider of liquidity to the market. The second sees it as providing liquidity to specific institutions, which
though solvent, are in difficulties. Hawtrey stressed the former element. Laidler (2002) also discusses this issue.
Hawtrey, it should be noted, was willing to countenance government expenditure financed by money creation should
open market operations fail, though he did not think this eventuality very likely. See Laidler (1999, pp. 125-126) on
this point.
13

A credit deadlock prevents money being created. In a liquidity trap, money lies idle after it has been created.
Keynes’ did much to refine the latter concept in the General Theory, though it is not clear that he believed in its
empirical relevance (See Laidler 1999, pp.258-259). However, a primitive version of the doctrine, that carried with it
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modern concept of a credit crunch. It locates the principal source of credit market difficulties in
the public’s unwillingness to borrow from the banking system rather than in the latter’s
unwillingness, or inability, to lend to the public. Nevertheless, the concepts are not totally
unrelated: a deadlock in credit relations between the central bank and commercial banks
stemming from their unwillingness to borrow new reserves can co-exist with a general
unwillingness on their part to lend to the public at large, and Hawtrey’s insistence on the
importance of the central bank providing cash to commercial banks seems partially to recognise
this.
Be that as it may, with reference to the specific situation in the United States in 1930,
Hawtrey argued explicitly that “demand could have been revived by a sufficient surplus of idle
money” (p.242) but pointed out that the Fed. had failed to provide such a surplus. Writing as he
was in 1932, however, he noted that “Much may be hoped from this policy [open market
purchases started in March 1932], if it is persisted in.” (p. 242). In the event, the 1932 initiative
also proved inadequate, perhaps because the operations were carried out on too small a scale, and
were brought to end prematurely. This was certainly the retrospective opinion of Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), and it was also the contemporary view of Currie, who, in (1934) succinctly
summed up the lessons of 1929-32 period in the following terms.

a warning that surplus balances might suddenly be spent, thus creating inflationary instability, was a commonplace
throughout the 1930s. For example, Hardy (1932, p. 92) argued as follows: “The result of open market purchases
during a depression might be simply to pile up idle reserves in banks, and idle balances in the hands of individuals,
until the load gets so great that confidence in the currency suddenly disappears -with the usual accompaniments-an
accentuated decline of business confidence, budget disorganization, gold hoarding, flight to foreign currencies, and
finally the complete collapse of the currency system”

12

“Much of the current belief in the powerlessness of the reserve banks appears to arise
from a complete misreading of the monetary history of 1929-32. It is generally held that
the reserve administration strove energetically to bring about expansion throughout the
depression but that contraction continued despite its efforts. Actually the reserve
administration’s policy was one of almost complete passivity and quiescence,” (Currie,
1934, p. 147)
This is not the place to debate the adequacy of an essentially monetary interpretation of
the Great Contraction.14 For purposes of this essay it is sufficient to summarise the following
salient characteristics of the body of economic doctrine of which it came to form so important a
part. First, and above all, that doctrine treated the cycle as an essentially monetary phenomenon,
not in the sense that it always had its origins in an exogenous monetary impulse, but in the sense
that its upswing and downswing represented a process in which expanding (contracting) money
and credit interacted recursively with rising (falling) prices and demand, and in which turning
points were initiated by changes in the willingness of the banking system to lend, and hence
create money. Second, and closely related, that doctrine argued that the cycle could be stabilised
by measures that would prevent cumulative expansion and contractions of money and credit
getting under way in the first place. Some of its exponents, for example Fisher, Simons, and, in
the post-war years, Friedman, thought that this could be achieved by imposing legally binding
rules of various kinds on the central bank.15 Others, were more cautious, and like Hawtrey,
preferred a discretionary approach to stabilisation policy, regarded price level stability as a sign
of its success, but also thought of the central bank’s lender of last resort powers, and more
specifically its powers to inject liquidity into the banking system, as being a vital second line of
defence should things nevertheless begin to go wrong, as they did in 1929.16
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The idea that a monetary interpretation of the Great Contraction and proposals for a monetary cure for it were the
unique product of a Chicago Tradition was once widely entertained, but is quite insupportable. Some Chicago
economists, for example Jacob Viner and Henry Simons did indeed support such a view-point, but it neither
originated at, nor was confined, to Chicago. For a fuller discussion, See Laidler (1999 pp. 231-239).
15

Fisher always favoured a price stability rule, and Friedman a money growth rule. Simons vacillated between the
two, but in 1936, opted for price level stability. On this latter point, see Laidler (1999, pp. 241-242)
16

It should be noted explicitly that, in the early 1930s, as the Great Contraction gathered momentum, Fisher was an
energetic advocate of monetary expansion aimed at restoring the price level to its 1929 level. His well known “debt
deflation theory of great depressions” (Fisher 1932, 1933) should be seen as an extension of a quantity theoretic
analysis of events that focussed on the consequences of rapidly falling prices. That theory added both strength and,
more important, urgency to Fisher’s longstanding claims on behalf of the virtues of price-level stability.
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The vision that has dominated monetary policy since the beginning of the 1990s is clearly
the latest incarnation of this approach. Its immediate intellectual roots lie in the monetarist
doctrines of the 1960s and 1970s which did so much to breathe new life into these older ideas,
and the main factor separating it from these roots has been its replacement of the legislated
money growth rule favoured by the academic exponents of monetarism with more practically
oriented inflation targets as anchors for monetary policy. This shift of emphasis has provided
policy makers with what they would defend as a much needed degree of discretion in their
choice of policy instruments and in their ability to manipulate of them.
And yet, just as things went wrong in the US in 1929, even though the price level seemed
to be behaving well, so they went wrong in Japan at the beginning of the 1990s under similar
circumstances, and again in the United States, and to a lesser degree in Europe too, in 2001. In
each case an asset market bubble seems to have developed and collapsed without this event
being preceded by any general upsurge of inflation. With the passage of time, it has become
tempting to treat the boom of the late 1920s that ended with the bursting of the stock market
bubble in 1929 as an outlier, but the recent occurrence of two apparently similar episodes
suggests that there are forces at work in the economy that are not properly integrated into those
explanations of the cycle and doctrines about macroeconomic stabilization that derive from the
quantity theory of money. That was precisely the opinion of a large number of economists
writing in the interwar period, as we shall now see.

Investment and Real Explanations the Cycle
The monetary theories of the cycle discussed above have, formally speaking, no special place for
investment expenditure. Within them, it is simply one component of aggregate demand that is
affected by monetary impulses. And yet no exponent of this approach would have denied that
asset market bubbles were financial market manifestations of deeper imbalances that had arisen
within the structure of the economy’s capital stock, or that their collapses had been accompanied
by the recognition of these real imbalances and an associated cessation, or at least a dramatic
slowdown, of investment activity.
Even in the early 1860s, when economists first began to recognise that the cycle involved
systematic fluctuations in real variables, it was known that investment activity was particularly
prone to large swings. Thus, Jevons (1863) conjectured that the fundamental causes of “great
commercial fluctuations, completing their course in some ten years” seemed to lie “in the
varying proportion which the capital devoted to permanent and remote investment bears to that
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which is but temporarily invested soon to reproduce itself.” (p. 27, Jevons’ italics), and he further
noted that “It is the peculiarity . . .of great and permanent works . . .to be multiplied at particular
periods.” (p. 28). Monetary theorists of the cycle were just as aware of these facts as anyone else.
In (1879) Marshall and Marshall had singled out for special mention “. . . companies [that]. .
.have borrowed vast sums with which they have begun to build docks and ships and ironworks
and factories” and whose projects were not yet complete as the crisis phase of the cycle
approaches, and in (1923) Marshall himself still found this passage sufficiently important to
quote, as we have already seen..
Hawtrey too was conscious of the empirical importance of fluctuations in fixed investment,
and, in his first book, Good and Bad Trade (1913, p. 207)) he went so far as to outline a simple
accelerator mechanism as an explanation of the phenomenon. But it is one thing to recognise and
attempt to explain what we would now call a stylized fact, and another to incorporate that
explanation systematically into the logical structure of a model, and this he failed to do. In
(1913), the accelerator was tacked on to Hawtrey’s analysis, and it disappeared altogether from
Currency and Credit (1919), the book that would nowadays be regarded as containing the
definitive exposition of his theory of the cycle.

Marshall’s Cambridge Successors
But Hawtrey, though a Cambridge graduate, and despite the similarities between his cycle theory
and Marshall’s, is not usually regarded as his intellectual heir, at least within academic
economics. Credit for developing Marshall’s thought at Cambridge in the 1920s and 1930s is
usually allocated, according to the commentator’s taste, among Arthur C. Pigou, Frederick W.
Lavington, and of course John Maynard Keynes, and in the inter-war years all of these made
serious and systematic efforts to incorporate the behaviour of investment into the Cambridge
cycle theory which Marshall had built on quantity-theoretic foundations.17
Pigou and Lavington overlaid Marshall’s account of the cumulative nature of upswings and
downswings with what was often characterised as a psychological theory, in which errors of
optimism and of pessimism drove business decisions, errors which were correlated across agents
and tended to be amplified with the passage of time. Furthermore,
“Inasmuch as optimism or pessimism naturally has greater influence on business
judgements the less certain the basis on which those judgements rest, it is only to be
expected that this influence should be most marked, and maladjustments of resources
17

I have discussed the work of Pigou and Lavington in Laidler (1999, pp. 83-90) and Keynes of the Tract and
Treatise in pp. 106-112 and pp.130-154, respectively of the same work.
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consequently most evident, in the output of new capital plant designed to produce goods
for very far-ahead and uncertain markets.” (Lavington, 1922, p. 91)
Cambridge theorists thus brought swings in investment into the explanation of the cycle as
a supplement to the recursive interactions among money, credit and prices that had dominated
Marshall’s account. As a corollary, they no longer regarded stabilisation of the price level as
sufficient to eliminate the cycle. Pigou (1929) opined as follows: “I hold that, if a policy of price
stabilisation were successfully carried through, the amplitude of industrial fluctuations would be
substantially reduced - it might be cut down to half of what it is at present - but considerable
fluctuations would still remain.” (p. 219) He advocated activist monetary policy, supplemented
by public works expenditure if need be, an approach to macroeconomic policy which was widely
implemented in the post-war years, only to be discredited by the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s
which ushered in the era of inflation targeting.
At one time it was usual to credit (or debit) Keynes (1936) with originating the case for
such policies, but it is by now uncontroversial that the major contribution of the General Theory
to inter-war policy controversy was to provide a more rigorous theoretical rationalisation than
had previously existed for an already widely accepted activism. Indeed Keynes was rather a latecomer to that position. The Tract on Monetary Reform (1923) starts just as clearly from the
quantity theory as anything that Hawtrey produced in the 1920s.18 As to the Treatise on Money
(1930), though it located the key to cyclical swings in the influence of the long rate of interest on
savings and investment, its formal analysis (as opposed to informal discussion) extended only to
cyclical swings in the price level. Its policy advice for dealing with the then just beginning Great
Contraction - “open market operations a outrance” - was, moreover, no different from
Hawtrey’s, though its theoretical basis was different. It was only after the publication of the
Treatise that Keynes began to move decisively towards the policy positions later associated with
his name, and, not entirely co-incidentally, to adopt an explanation of fluctuations in investment
that, focussing as it did on the role of animal spirits, differed from that offered earlier by
Lavington and Pigou more in vocabulary than in substance.
We shall return to the matter of generalised macroeconomic activism below, but first we
need to look at approaches to explaining the cycle that paid even closer attention to the role of
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Large parts of the Tract should be read as constructive comments about the practicalities of the Genoa Resolutions
of 1923, whose principle architect was Hawtrey, offered by a critic who completely accepted their analytic basis. See
Laidler (1999, pp.106-107, 122-123) Those resolutions sought to re-establish the gold standard as a basis for
internationally co-ordinated monetary stabilization policy, and Keynes’s proposals for a heavily managed float
between sterling and the US dollar amounted to a modification of this recommendation.
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investment in economic fluctuations than did anything developed at Cambridge, and therefore
deviated much more radically from the quantity theory tradition.

The Influence of Marx and Wicksell.
The quantity theory of money was far from providing the only starting point for thinking about
the cycle in the 19th century. Karl Marx’s Capital (1867) set out an alternative and very different
view of the workings of the market economy. Rather than present capitalism as a system which,
if left to itself, tended to converge on some sort of full-employment equilibrium in the wake of
monetary disturbances, Marx identified a process of inherently unstable cyclical economic
growth as its central feature, and he expressed contempt for any purely monetary explanation of
fluctuations: “The superficiality of political economy shows itself in the fact that it looks upon
the expansion and contraction of credit, which is a mere symptom of the periodic changes of the
industrial cycle, as their cause.” (1867, p. 633)
For Marx, the cycle was not the outcome of a series of shocks that created fluctuations
around an equilibrium growth path. Rather it was the essential characteristic of that growth path,
the inevitable consequence of the relentless pursuit of profit by the capitalist class. In the
expansion phase, individual capitalists pursued relative surplus value by investing in ever more
efficient labour saving machinery, but from the viewpoint of their class as a whole, this was self
defeating. In a competitive market economy, the value of goods was determined by the labour
socially necessary to produce them, and the very process of widespread investment in innovative
technology reduced this. Thus the economy-wide rate of profit was also driven down, bringing
about a crisis and a halt to the economy’s expansion. Labour was then released into the reserve
army of the unemployed and would provide cannon-fodder for the next expansion. A succession
of ever more violent cycles would culminate in a crisis severe enough to provoke revolution.
Now many more economists were influenced by this vision of the cycle than adopted the
revolutionary Socialist doctrines that Marx believed it to imply. Indeed, in the period that is the
focus of this paper, theories that emphasised the role of innovation as the main impetus driving
cyclical growth were probably a majority taste among continental economists. A large literature
noted the challenges posed to the stability of the growth process by the time lags inherent in the
construction of capital goods, and their indivisibility and durability once they were in place. It is
impossible to do justice to the non-quantity-theoretic, but nevertheless monetary, analyses of the
cycle to which the next section of this paper is devoted without understanding that they are the
outcome of attempts to reconcile these ideas, which may here conveniently be labelled as
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representing a real tradition in business cycle analysis, to neoclassical doctrines which placed
more emphasis on monetary factors.19
A crucial link between these two traditions lies in the work of Wicksell, who, though
apparently little known among economists writing in English until the late 1920s, was influential
elsewhere from a much earlier date.20 His now well known cumulative process analysis focussed
on the interaction of the market rate of interest, set by banks, with the natural rate, which in
various places, and inconsistently, he defined as the marginal product of capital, the rate of
interest at which saving and investment would be equal in a frictionless barter economy, and the
rate of interest to which the market rate had to be equated to stabilize the price level.21 Wicksell
himself thought of this analysis as extending the quantity theory of money to a world dominated
by banks, and saw it as a tool for explaining secular movements in the price level rather than
cyclical fluctuations. It was also his view that, in the 19th century at least, such movements had
mainly originated on the real side of the economy as productivity shocks drove the natural rate of
interest away from the market rate.
Consistent with this, Wicksell’s few sketchy writings on the cycle show him to have been
close to the real business cycle tradition, more particularly that branch of it that is particularly
associated with Marx and, later, Joseph Schumpeter in emphasising the role of technical change
as the fundamental source of economic fluctuations, and sceptical about attributing any
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Much of the relevant literature was written in German, and it is one of the many virtues of Harald Hagemann’s
(2002) four volume collection of key papers in the development of business cycle analysis that several critical
contributions are made available in English for the first time.
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The question of Wicksell’s influence on English language economics is a thorny one. It is usually accepted that,
before the considerable attention given to it by Keynes in the Treatise, his work was largely unknown, and certainly
it was not cited before then in England. In the United States Fisher (1911, pp. 59-60) did acknowledge his work,
however, and a key paper summarising his theory of inflation (Wicksell 1907) was presented at the meetings of the
British Association for the Advancement of Science and published in the Economic Journal.
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The inconsistency between defining the natural rate in terms of its capacity to generate price level stability and
equilibrium between savings and investment will be discussed below. The very real problems inherent as treating it
as the marginal product of capital per unit of capital in a world of heterogeneous capital goods are not quite central
to this paper, and will not be discussed. For my own views on this contentious issue, see Laidler (1999, pp. 33-34,
53-57)
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important causative role to the monetary sector.22 Small wonder then, that Wicksell’s successors
saw the potential for his cumulative process to become a starting point for cycle theories based
on the idea that the monetary sector interacts with the real economy by way of the influence of
the interest rate on savings and investment, and used it as such, thus providing an alternative to
monetary theories that began from the influence of the quantity of money on prices.

Forced Saving, Relative Prices and the Cycle
Real cycle theory and Wicksellian monetary economics crucially influenced, on the one hand,
the work of the so-called Austrians - Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek and Lionel
Robbins among others -, and of Dennis Robertson on the other.23 The first these, exponents of a
self-consciously individualist economics that was closely allied to political liberalism, reacted
strongly against any presumption that market economies were inherently unstable, and their
work should be seen as an attempt to refute this postulate, while reconciling the basic facts of the
cycle, including those concerning investment activity, with neo-classical orthodoxy. In contrast,
Robertson’s earliest book, A Study of Industrial Fluctuation (1915) was heavily empirical,
located firmly and sympathetically in the tradition of explaining the cycle in terms of waves of
fixed investment driven by innovation, and it acknowledged the specific influence of the work of
Michael Tugan-Baranowski and Albert Aftalion.24 It was only in the 1920s, under the influence
of Keynes, that Robertson broadened his analysis to accord a significant role to monetary factors
in the cycle.
Though they proceeded independently of one another, and initially in ignorance of each
others’ work too, the Austrians and Robertson developed views of the role of the monetary
system in the economy that had many analytic properties in common. Critically for the matters
under discussion in this paper, these views led them to be sceptical about the sufficiency of price
level stability for the overall stability of the economy, and to propose price deflation at the
economy’s rate of productivity growth as a defence against the development of imbalances in
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Schumpeter’s definitive contribution to this tradition, which amply justifies the coupling of his name with that of
Marx in defining it, was not published until (1939) and therefore lies beyond the scope of this paper. On his
interesting, but hardly central, contributions to the debates of the early 1930s, see Laidler (1999, pp.216-218)
23
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financial markets and, more fundamentally, in the underlying structure of the real capital stock.25
But, Robertson also differed sharply from the Austrians on some important matters. In particular
his scepticism about the capacity of market mechanisms to function smoothly without help from
policy makers led him to be much more activist in his advice than were they.

Forced Saving in Austrian Analysis
As Hagemann (1994) has pointed out, though Hayek’s Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle did
not appear in English until 1933, its German version was written in 1928, initially as a response
to the socialist economist Adolf Loewe (later Adolph Lowe). Loewe (1926) had challenged not
just a particular approach to cycle theory, but the entire paradigm of neo-classical theory as it
was then represented by general equilibrium analysis. He had argued that the basic claim that the
economic system had a tendency always to return towards equilibrium after an exogenous
disturbance was inconsistent with the obvious fact that actual economies continuously moved
over time in a series of cyclical swings that never showed any sign of coming to rest, let alone in
any state that remotely resembled such an equilibrium. This observation was, in his view, more
consistent with a vision of an essentially unstable system driven by an open ended process of
capital accumulation than anything offered by neo-classical theory.26
It is easy to forget nowadays that, perhaps especially in the German speaking world of the
late 1920s, a challenge like this was of more than merely academic significance. What was
required to meet it in the eyes of committed liberals like the Austrians was, first a model
inhabited by maximising agents, initially in general equilibrium, which, when subjected to a
certain type of disturbance would move along a time path that for a while led cumulatively away
from the initial equilibrium, and then reversed direction only to overshoot that same equilibrium,
and second, some insight into how these tendencies could be curbed. Hayek attempted to rebut
Loewe by arguing that a business cycle theory such as that already sketched by Ludwig von
Mises in (1912, 1924) would do just this. Many of his contemporaries agreed with him, and
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George Selgin (1997) has recently restated the case for aiming monetary policy at a rate of deflation equal to the
economy’s rate of productivity growth., arguing that, relative to price level stability, such a goal “(1) is likely to
involve lower ‘menu’ costs of price adjustment; (2) is less likely to invite monetary misperception effects; (3) is
more conducive to the achievement of efficient outcomes using fixed nominal contracts; and (4) generally keeps the
money stock closer to its ‘optimum’ level.” (p.70)
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Translations of two important papers by Loewe (1926-28 and 1926) are now available in Hagemann (ed.) (2002,
Vols. III and IV,) respectively, while a translation of Hayek’s original (1928) reply appears in Vol. III).
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Hayek’s own elaboration of this theory in his (1931) LSE lectures on Prices and Production for
a while looked set to create a revolution in macroeconomic thought of a magnitude achieved a
little later by Keynes.
Mises’ original insight had come in response to a puzzle posed by Wicksell.’s cumulative
process analysis. In an economy that used currency as well as bank deposits as money, and in
which the banks held reserves, a shortfall of the market from the natural rate of interest could not
persist. The inflation that it generated would increase the public’s demand for currency, and the
resulting drain of reserves from the banks would cause them to raise the market rate so that it
equalled the natural rate, thus restoring equilibrium to both the real economy and its monetary
sector. But Wicksell had also analysed the theoretically limiting case of a pure credit economy,
in which there was no currency, and all transactions were carried out using deposits. Here, if a
shortfall of the market from the natural rate of interest led only to inflation, there would be no
mechanism to bring the market rate back into equilibrium with the natural rate, and
disequilibrium could apparently persist for ever. Mises found the conclusion deeply
discomfiting, and in order to meet the challenge it presented, he introduced the process now
known as forced saving into the Wicksellian framework.27
This mechanism depends crucially upon three special assumptions, the first two of which
Mises, Hayek, and most other exponents of forced saving usually left unstated. The first is that
the newly created bank deposits that enter circulation when the natural rate of interest exceeds
the market rate do so by way of loans to firms; in modern terminology, for forced saving to
occur, there must be limited participation in the market for bank credit. The second is that any
effects on the general price level that arise from money creation leave the real consumption plans
of the general public unaffected; in modern equilibrium models of inflation, money holders vary
their consumption in order to maintain their real balances in equilibrium as the inflation rate
varies, thus paying seigniorage to the creators of nominal balances, but for the forced saving
mechanism to work along Austrian lines, the effects of nominal money creation must be
unanticipated. Finally, and Hayek would elevate this assumption to a methodological principle,
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It should be noted that The Austrians did not originate the idea of forced saving and that Wicksell was aware of it
though he did not explore its implications for his cumulative process. The idea can be traced back to the very
beginning of the 19th century. Hayek (1932) provides the still standard account of the doctrine’s development from
its origins in comments by Jeremy Bentham and Henry Thornton.
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in Austrian analysis any conceptual experiment involving variations in the rate of money
creation had to begin with the economy in full general equilibrium at full employment.28
On these three assumptions, money creation following the opening up of a discrepancy
between the natural and market rates of interest can have certain effects beyond those on the
general price level that Wicksell analysed. This money goes, in the first instance, into the hands
of firms for whom the expected return on new investments (the natural rate) is now higher than
the rate of interest at which they are borrowing (the market rate). The demand for investment
goods thus increases, and the firms that produce them are able to bid resources away from the
consumption goods sector. Households, who have anticipated none of this, are, in effect, forced
to reduce their consumption, and therefore to increase their saving, in real terms.
In the Austrian way of putting these matters, a voluntary decision to save by households is
simultaneously a decision to consume at some time in the future, while a decision to invest by
firms is simultaneously a decision to supply consumption goods in the future, and the rate of
interest is the crucial relative price that co-ordinates these choices. Only so long as the market
rate of interest is equal to the natural rate does it accomplish this, and create a state of what was
usually called monetary neutrality. Another way of looking at the process of forced saving, then,
is to observe that a shortfall of the market rate of interest below its natural value involves firms
receiving a signal that the price of future consumption goods has risen relative to that of present
consumption goods, and that they should switch the production of such goods from the present to
the future, without households having transmitted any such signal. The latter reduce current
consumption because the operations of the monetary system compel them to do so, and not
because they want to raise their future consumption.
In short, forced saving is the outcome of a co-ordination failure with respect to the intertemporal allocation of resources. It occurs because a relative price is set at a disequilibrium value
by the banking system. The longer it continues, the greater is the imbalance created between
firms’ capacity to provide consumer goods in the future, and households’ desires to purchase
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The limited participation assumption presumably reflects the characteristics of universal banking as practised on
the Continent in the 1920s. The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated inflation was simply not part of
the infra-structure of macroeconomic theory in the 1920s, even though certain ideas that we now know to depend
crucially upon it - the Fisher effect and the inflation tax - were current. As to assuming full employment, it seemed
only proper that an explanation of unemployment should begin at full employment and show how unemployment
could then develop. As it happened, the task of assuming, without explanation, the existence of unemployment, and
then showing how its level could change, proved much more tractable, and its results much more illuminating too, as
Brinley Thomas (1936), who built on foundations provided by the Stockholm School would note. See Laidler (1999,
pp. 63-64)
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them, an imbalance that is matched by a shortfall in firms’ ability to meet households’ current
demand for consumer goods. But, continue it will, so long as the crucial inter-temporal relative
price remains at the wrong level.

Crises as the Inevitable Result of Forced Saving
Up to this point, given the assumptions underlying the analysis, the conclusions follow. It is
indeed the case that the banking system’s power to make loans with newly created deposits that
have no counterpart in savings decisions by households can be a source of disturbances to
investment and saving, that these can persist for a while, and that this can cause trouble. But the
conclusions that Mises, and after him, Hayek, Robbins and others went on to draw from this
insight were, when considered in the light of the criticism to which they were subsequently
subjected, highly speculative, to say the least.
In particular the assumption that it begins at full employment is critical to the forced saving
process. If resources are not fully utilised when firms receive a signal to increase investment,
then they can clearly do so without forcing a decrease in consumption. Indeed there is room for
both investment and consumption to increase together. Since cyclical upswings typically begin
from a trough that is characterised by unemployment generated during a previous downswing,
forced saving cannot be a feature of the whole cycle, but only, at most, of the later stages of its
upswing when resource constraints have begun to bite.
This insight, however, was not available to the Austrians in the late 1920s, and they argued
that, once an expansion was under way, whose central feature was always, in their view, a
process of forced saving, a crisis was inevitably in the making. It would involve the excess
demand for current consumption goods making itself felt before new investment goods had been
completed and brought into production. More by a leap of intuition than careful analysis, the
Austrians identified the disruption associated with attempts to unwind the imbalances created by
forced saving with the onset of the downswing and subsequent depression, and they suggested
that analysis along these lines “leads ultimately to a theory of business cycles” (Mises, 1924, p.
365). According to that theory, as elaborated, for example by Hayek (1931), crises could be
staved off temporarily by keeping the market rate of interest below the natural rate, but this
would be at the cost of making them more severe when they arrived. And arrive they eventually
would, for a side effect of prolonging the process of forced saving by ever more credit creation
would be an inflation rate that would rise to ultimately intolerable levels. As Lionel Robbins put
it in (1934)
“Once costs have begun to rise it would require a continuous increase in the rate of
increase of credit to prevent the thing coming to disaster. But that itself, as we have seen in
23

the great post-war inflations, would eventually generate panic. Sooner or later the initial
errors are discovered. And then starts a reverse rush for liquidity. The Stock Exchange
collapses. There is a stoppage of new issues. Production in the industries producing capital
goods slows down. The boom is at an end.” (pp. 41-42)
This is not the place to embark on a detailed critique of Austrian cycle theory. Suffice it to
suggest that its exponents took logical possibilities implicit in the analysis of forced saving, and
treated them as logical necessities.29 As one sympathetic modern commentator has remarked,
“the Austrian theory is not a theory of depression per se, but rather a theory of the unsustainable
boom” (Garrison,2001, p. 240). Given the Austrians’ underlying agenda, however, which was to
produce a theory of the cycle that was compatible with a general equilibrium theory strongly
tinged with methodological individualism, and could be used to counter socialist critiques of a
liberal capitalist society, and given that the great hyper-inflations were a recent memory, one can
see how they were led into their over-generalizations.

Forced Saving without Price Inflation
For all its weaknesses however, one feature of Austrian analysis remains particularly relevant to
the topic of this paper: namely, the insight that forced saving can nevertheless take place and
create trouble against a background of stable, or even falling prices. This possibility, which sets
Austrian theory apart from a more traditional quantity theoretic approach to the cycle, as
Garrison (2001, p. 242) stresses, arises when the effects of economic growth, particularly that
which arises from productivity improvements as opposed to mere increases in population, are
brought into the picture.30
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See Laidler 1999, pp. 45-46, pp. 51-75, and pp. 63-67, for accounts of and references to contemporary treatments
of forced saving that suggested that an initial excess of investment over saving might generate an equilibrating
response on the part of savers. Among the possibilities that the Austrians did not notice, but were raised by their
contemporaries, were that changes in the distribution of income from wages to profits during the upswing might
cause an increase in voluntary saving and eliminate disequilibrium between saving and investment, that the creation
of an appropriate amount of new bank credit by way of consumer loans (at that time a new phenomenon, largely
confined to the US) could enable households to hold their own in competition with firms, and that, as inflation
became anticipated agents would increase their saving in order to maintain their holdings of real balances. The last
effect will be discussed below, in the context of Robertson’s work.
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The literature associated with the forced saving concept sometimes encountered extremely heavy weather in
dealing with this distinction between the sources of economic growth. Dennis Robertson (1926, 1928a and b) whose
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Wicksell had defined the natural rate of interest as that which would equate saving and
investment at full employment, hence implying zero credit creation by the banking system, but
he had also defined it as the interest rate which, if it ruled in the market place, would generate
stable prices. In a stationary economy, where savings and investment are equal to zero, these two
definitions are compatible, but not in a growing economy. There, on the assumption that the
velocity of circulation is constant, zero credit creation implies deflation at the economy’s rate of
growth. Given this, and the assumption that its effects on the price level are unanticipated, forced
saving is always implicit in positive credit creation in conditions of full employment, and will
occur in a growing economy whenever the rate of price level change lies above that rate of
deflation.31 The potential significance of this conclusion for the behaviour of the US economy in
the 1920s was not lost on the Austrians, and it formed the basis of their interpretation of the
Great Contraction and its aftermath.
But to explain 1929 and its aftermath as a crisis created by a prior process of forced saving
required them to argue that disequilibria in the inter-temporal allocation of resources sufficient to
have provoke it had built up even without the onset of general inflation. On Hayek’s treatment of
this specific point, Gottfried von Haberler, himself an ardent exponent of Austrian theory in
(1932), would later remark “the reasoning is not . . .altogether convincing” (1937, p. 52), and his
more general conclusion was
“. . .that the present theory does not prove, as it claims to do, that a credit expansion which
does not lead to a rise in prices but only prevents a fall in prices must have the same evil
effect as the more violent type which brings about a rise in the absolute price level” (p. 51)
Once again, we see the Austrians criticised for claiming that a logically possible outcome was
logically necessary. But we should also note that, as far as the sufficiency of price level stability
for general economic stability is concerned, the mere logical possibility that forced saving can
cause trouble under such a regime is of some significance.

variation on the forced saving theme will be discussed below, dealt extensively with this matter, but the space
available in this paper does not permit to do full justice to the topic.
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Let it be noted explicitly that modern analysis would tell us that any rate of inflation is compatible with monetary
equilibrium and therefore the absence of disequilibrium forced saving, just so long as it is properly anticipated in the
term structure of nominal interest rates, a result stated by Eric Lindahl in (1930), though its significance would not
penetrate the literature beyond that written in Sweden till much later. Deflation at the rate of productivity growth
remains of some analytic significance, however, because at that rate, when it is fully anticipated, the revenue
accruing to the monetary system from seigniorage - what Robertson (1926) called “induced lacking” is zero. See
below for further discussion.
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Austrian Policy Prescriptions
Be that as it may, what seems to have undermined the reputation of Austrian cycle theory as the
1930s progressed was not so much doubts about its coherence as a positive theory of the cycle,
but some of the normative implications that were claimed to follow from it. These reversed the
assignment of priorities between prevention and cure for financial and real instability implicit in
quantity theoretic reasoning. Where Hawtrey, for example, advocated stabilising the price level,
and meeting the consequences of any crises that might nevertheless occur with vigorous money
creation after the event, the Austrians argued that the central policy problem was to prevent
crises happening in the first place. This was to be accomplished by avoiding any net credit
creation by the banking system, or, if the velocity of circulation could not be relied upon to
remain stable, by varying credit creation so as to stabilise the rate of flow of money expenditure.
Where prevention had failed, as they thought it was very likely to do, the Austrians further,
and crucially, argued that expansionary monetary policy, and/or fiscal measures designed to
increase investment and consumption expenditures would make matters worse rather than better,
and were to be avoided.32 In the aftermath of a crisis that had been brought about by excessive
credit expansion, and excessive investment, and had been characterised by a demand for
consumption goods in excess of the economy’s capacity to supply them, such measures were
likely to lead to another and greater crisis rather than to provide a useful remedy for what ailed
the economy.
It was for this reason that, in the early 1930s, the Austrians urged governments to remain
passive and allow the passage of time to unwind the imbalances in the capital stock that they
thought lay at the root of the depression. In so doing, they lent considerable academic
respectability to similar views, based on the so-called needs of trade or real bills doctrine, which
at that time had wide currency in banking circles in general, and at the Federal Reserve Board in
particular. Exponents of the latter doctrine argued that, in the late 1920s, credit creation in the
United States had gone beyond meeting the needs of firms for working capital and had fuelled an
“artificial” investment boom. As a corollary they argued that, after 1929, any monetary
expansion that did not await the revival of economic activity ran the risk of reigniting
inflationary speculation.33 With the implementation of the New Deal, such views became
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For a more detailed discussion of Austrian policy proposals, See Laidler (1999, pp 46-49)
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And the influence of such views had a great deal to do with the indecisiveness of Fed. policy during the Great
Contraction, as both Currie (1934), and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued. For a contemporary example of such
analysis, see Willis (1932). It is also worth noting that, partly, under the influence of Joseph Schumpeter’s own
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increasingly unpopular, and Austrian cycle theory began to suffer from guilt by association, as
for example, Friedman (1974) would later note.34
Lionel Robbins’ (1971) retrospective verdict on Austrian theory is worth quoting at some
length. On the policy nihilism which he himself had supported in the early 1930s, he commented
as follows:
“On the assumption that the original diagnosis of excessive financial ease and mistaken
real investment was correct - which is certainly not a settled matter - to treat what
developed subsequently in the way which I then thought valid was as unsuitable as denying
blankets and stimulants to a drunk who has fallen into an icy pond, on the grounds that his
original problem was overheating. I shall always regard this aspect of my dispute with
Keynes as the greatest mistake of my professional career, and the book The Great
Depression, which I subsequently wrote, partly in justification of this attitude, as
something which I would willingly see forgotten ” (p. 154)
But he was somewhat kinder to the positive aspects of the theory :
“Now I still think that there is much in this theory as an explanation of a possible
generation of boom and crisis. I suspect that there are some episodes in economic
history, the railway crisis of 1847 and the American crisis of 1907 for instance, on which it
can cast valuable light. I am strengthened in this view that something like it, although with
a different terminology and a different derivation, figures largely in one of Dennis
Robertson’s models. But, as an explanation of what was going on in the early thirties, I
now think it was misleading. Whatever the genetic factors of the pre-1929 boom, their
sequelae, in the sense of inappropriate investments fostered by wrong expectations, were
completely swamped by vast deflationary forces sweeping away all those elements of
constancy in the situation which otherwise might have provided a framework for an
explanation in my terms. The theory was inadequate to the facts ” (p. 154, Robbins’ italics)
Now Robbins’ mention of Robertson in this context is telling, Forced saving (often under
the label “involuntary lacking”) does indeed figure prominently in the latter’s interwar work, but
not as an explanation in and of itself of the crisis phase of the cycle. Rather, as we shall now see,
it appears as one element in an altogether more eclectic story.
distinctive brand of Austrian analysis, a number of Harvard economists adopted a confused and sceptical attitude to
activist policies intended to counter the contraction. See Brown et al. (1934)
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See Friedman (1974, pp.163-165) Unfortunately, in this passage, Friedman describes the Austrian view as an
“atrophied and rigid caricature” of the quantity theory, thus displaying an extremely uncertain grasp of its
intellectual origins.
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Robertson’s Approach
Just as certain political preconceptions underlay Austrian cycle theory, so was it with
Robertson’s work. Nowadays he is mainly remembered as an effective critic of Keynes’s (1936)
rejection of what the latter called “classical economics” and hence as something of a scientific
conservative, but his work is in fact marked by the same scepticism about the self-regulating
nature of the market economy and faith in the abilities of well informed policy makers to remedy
this state of affairs as was Keynes’s. If he expressed these attitudes with less self-confidence, this
had more to do with his personal style than with the depth of his convictions about these matters.
Robertson’s cycle theory had continental, and ultimately Marxist, roots. He stressed waves
of innovation as the basic source of fluctuations, and unlike those Cambridge economists more
closely wedded to the quantity theory, he entertained the possibility that to this extent they were
“appropriate” phenomena, whose stabilization might do more harm than good.
“I do not feel confident that a policy which, in the pursuit of stability prices, output and
employment, had nipped in the bud the English railway boom of the forties, or the
American railway boom of 1869-71, or the German electrical boom of the nineties, would
have been on the balance beneficial to the populations concerned.” (1926, p. 22).
But in practice, Robertson thought it all too likely that “inappropriate” fluctuations in output
would be overlaid upon the appropriate ones by the malfunctioning of the monetary system, and
it was in this context that he deployed his analysis of forced saving. He developed this idea quite
independently of Mises and Hayek, and indeed a little before the latter took it up, but his
approach had much in common with theirs, as Robbins noted. Even so, in the context of this
paper, it is the differences between the two versions of the doctrine that merit particular
attention.
As we have seen, forced saving occurs when an economy operating at full employment is
disturbed by the opening up of a discrepancy between Wicksellian natural and market rates of
interest. Although the Austrians recognised that shocks to the system could arise in principle
from either the real or monetary side of the equation, in practice they treated the banking system
as the main source of disturbances. Not so Robertson, for whom inappropriate fluctuations in
output were usually the result of market interest rates failing to catch up with the effects of
innovation on the expected returns to investment. Quite unlike the Austrians, moreover, he was
even willing to contemplate the possibility that forced saving, though usually destructive, might
in some circumstances have a beneficial effect. Specifically, he lacked confidence in the capacity
of the short-end of the market automatically to provide the working capital needed to bring plant
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and equipment into production once it had been created, and looked to the banking system to
provide firms with the means of acquiring it.35
“I am not sure that a little forced saving now and again may not be the necessary price we
have to pay for what we call progress, and that a doctrinaire application of the principle of
price-stabilisation in all circumstances might not be inimical to the rapid growth of
economic welfare.” (1928b, p. 145).
Evidently, then, Robertson did not regard forced saving as an inevitable harbinger of crisis
in the way that the Austrian did. In part, this open-mindedness stemmed from greater analytic
sophistication on Robertson’s part. Unlike Mises, Hayek, Robbins, or anyone else in that camp,
he understood that, because rising prices would reduce the real value of the public’s cash
holdings, “it is at least possible that some of them will seek to restore this real value towards its
old level, and to that end to refrain from consumption . . .” (1928b, p. 134) This effect, which in
(1926) he had labelled “induced lacking”, is the very one that lies at the heart of analyses of the
extraction of seigniorage in modern models of fully anticipated inflation, and in principle it
would ensure that the banking system could continuously transfer resources from the public at
large to firms without the process breaking down. The saving needed to finance the extra
investment would be voluntary, in the sense that it would arise from the payment of what we
now call the inflation tax.36
Even so, Robertson understood just as well as did the Austrians that forced saving could
occur in a growing economy without prices having to rise, and he also believed, as did they, that
it had considerable potential to do harm. That is why, in 1928, he expressed trepidation at the
way events were unfolding in the United States: “. . .in so far as the Federal System [sic] has not
gone all out for stabilising the price of labour, it cannot, I think, be wholly absolved from the
charge of having burgled from the public in these years of rapidly advancing productivity”
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Robertson’s particular stress on the provision of short-term capital by way of forced saving reflects the practices
of the British and American commercial banking systems. Any careful comparison of Austrian and Robertsonian
treatments of forced saving needs to pay attention to the different assumptions about the nature of banking
institutions that were usually left implicit in their analysis.
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In this context, Robertson’s acknowledgement that the analysis of induced lacking was suggested to him by
Keynes is worth noting, since the latter had already set out a treatment of the inflation tax in the Tract (1923).On this
See Laidler (1999, pp.95-96, pp.110-111). Harry Johnson (1974) pointed out the relationship between the analysis
of forced saving as developed by Robertson in the 1920s, and that of the inflation tax, seigniorage and the revenue
from money creation (the three terms are synonymous). The latter topic was much discussed among monetary
theorists for two decades following the work of Martin Bailey (1956) and a key contribution which either avoided or
cleared up the many analytic confusions that permeated much earlier work was Alvin Marty (1976)
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(1928b, p. 144, Robertson’s italics). He particularly feared for the consequences “if that great
country should ever become even temporarily saturated with 50-storey buildings and motor cars”
(p. 146 Robertson’s italics), noting that
“The out-and-out price-stabiliser claims that he can always check a fall in prices and cure
unemployment by monetary means . . . I think the difficulties experienced by the Federal
Reserve system even in times of raging prosperity should make us pause before admitting
such extreme claims.” (1928b, p. 146)
Not that Robertson came anywhere near to Austrian nihilism in his prescriptions for policy in the
event of a crisis. On the contrary he was just as much an activist as any of the Cambridge
economists discussed earlier in this paper37.
“. . .the ideal banking policy might be one which was founded on the principle of pricestabilisation as a norm, but which was ready to see the fruits of a prolonged and general
increase in individual productivity shared in the form of lower prices, and perhaps to
acquiesce in moderate price-rises in order that advantage might be taken of discontinuous
leaps in industrial technique. And it would be a policy that did not claim omnipotence, or
feel competent of its ability to cure the evils of uncertainty except in alliance with a much
more comprehensive attempt to control and stabilise the desires and activities of the
community than most monetary reformers - even I think, the most thorough-going
Socialists - have yet visualised” (1928b, p. 146)
Robertson’s avoidance of Austrian policy conclusions about how to deal with crisis and
the depression which would inevitable follow it, despite his belief in the capacity of forced
saving to generate excessive investment, has a very simple and down-to-earth explanation,
namely that he invariably associated such investment with the over-expansion of particular
sectors of the economy, rather than with the creation of an economy-wide imbalance in the
capital stock. He therefore believed that there was always scope to fill any void in demand
stemming from a private sector collapse, as his following comment on the desirability of
deploying counter-cyclical public expenditure policies makes clear.
“What, after all, can be more sensible than that the Central government should organise a
collective demand for telephone equipment, or the local governments a collective demand
for municipal lavatories, to take the place of an individual demand for ships or steel rails,
which has rightly and reasonably fallen temporarily away?” (1928a, p. 178)
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It should be noted that, just as Pigou came to pay increasing attention to forced saving as the 1920s progressed, so
did Robertson appreciate the potential significance of error. See Laidler (1999, pp.89-90, 98-99)
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Some Tentative Lessons
To draw conclusions from an earlier literature about current monetary policy is always risky. No
matter what some might claim about the universality of the laws of economic science, it has
often been observed that monetary economics in particular evolves along with monetary
institutions, and the possibility that conclusions drawn at an earlier time, might have lost their
validity with the passage of time is ever present.38 But recent bouts of asset market instability
and associated problems in the real economy, do seem to present puzzles that contemporary
economic theory has trouble getting to grips with, and they do bear more than a passing
resemblance to earlier episodes, so perhaps the literature discussed in this paper might have
something to tell us about our present problems.

Continuity and Discontinuity in Economic Ideas
As we saw above, there is considerable continuity in what has here been called the quantitytheoretic approach to the cycle in particular, and asset market instability in particular. Its current
exponents still argue that monetary policy cannot be expected to do more than influence the price
level, and the differences between their advocacy of targets for low inflation and the preferences
of, say Marshall, Hawtrey or the Keynes of the Tract, for outright price level stability are surely
of minor significance to anyone who believes that the virtues of such policy goals should be
analysed on the assumption that the inflation rate is fully anticipated. Furthermore, they are every
bit as insistent on the rapid deployment of the central bank’s powers of money creation, should
things nevertheless go wrong, as their inter-war predecessors.
There is less continuity between the ideas of inter-war and contemporary critics of the
quantity theoretic tradition. Like their predecessors, of course, the latter are still concerned with
the apparent inability of a monetary policy geared solely to the general price level to forestall
instability in asset markets, and they also suggest that monetary policy should try to deal with
this phenomenon. But beyond this point, differences begin to appear. Nowadays, the case that
monetary policy should concern itself with asset prices is mainly justified by the possibility that
banking systems can cease to function efficiently as providers of credit to the private sector once
asset market instability turns into outright crisis. Interwar economists did not neglect instability
in asset markets or the banking system in particular, or indeed financial markets more generally,
but dissenters from quantity theoretic analysis among them paid far more attention to the
38

This was a constant theme in the later writings of Sir John Hicks, right down to his final book (1989), and it
permeates the post-Keynesian writings of Victoria Chick: eg (1992)
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possibility that such difficulties reflected altogether deeper problems with the structure of the
real economy. The Austrians aside, moreover, they adopted a far more activist approach to
macroeconomic policy than anything that is to be found among critics of current policy
orthodoxy, whose main concern seems to be that monetary policy should look beyond stabilising
the inflation rate, and pay special attention to asset prices.

Co-ordination Failures
I conjecture that the reason for this latter difference, and also for our current perplexity about
how monetary policy should be configured in the light of the experience of Japan, or more
recently the United States, to mention but two examples, stems from the fact that much of
economics as it is now widely taught has tried to settle an old debate about a matter of real
substance by methodological fiat. That old debate, whose importance Axel Leijonhufvud (eg.
1981, 1999) has long stressed, reached a peak in the inter-war years. It was about whether, and, if
not, the extent to which, the institutions of a market economy were up to the task of
harmoniously co-ordinating the maximising decisions of self-interested individual agents.
Nowadays, this debate is short-circuited by the widely held belief that good scientific practice
requires us to assume that markets always clear, unless specific reasons rooted in maximising
behaviour conditioned on all relevant and available information can be given for assuming
otherwise.39 This belief has led much economic theory to take it for granted that the interest rate,
or the term structure thereof, successfully co-ordinates the allocation of resources over time,
even though this assumption makes it very hard to understand such phenomena as canals and
railways that lead to nowhere, see-through office buildings, mile upon mile of redundant fibreoptic cable, etc.
In earlier times, when, by and large, economists started with facts to be explained, and
worked backwards to more and more general explanations, it was regarded as methodologically
legitimate to postulate co-ordination failures to account for observations without first of all
having to rationalise these in terms of some set of deeper (and allegedly first) principles. And
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But not by everyone: I have already mentioned Victoria Chick’s contribution to the post-Keynesian literature, and
Axel Leijonhufvud’s constant and eloquent insistence of the importance of co-ordination issues and to the rich interwar literature dealing with them, continues to do so). Garrison (2001) to which I have also referred above represents
a recent and refreshingly unorthodox attempt to blend insights culled from quantity theoretic and Austrian
approaches to the cycle into an account of the phenomenon that places co-ordination failures at the centre of things.
But students trained in mainstream modern macroeconomics find it hard to come to grips with such contributions
because they are not susceptible to the equilibrium modelling techniques in which they are so well drilled.
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given the facts of 19th century fluctuations, let alone those of the inter-war years, this seemed like
a reasonable procedure. The key positive question underlying the literature discussed in this
paper was, that is to say, what sort of co-ordination failure was responsible for observed
fluctuations, and the key normative question was what policy should do about it. These seem to
me to remain interesting questions, even if the current rules of the game make it embarrassing to
pose them in respectable academic circles.
Exponents of a quantity-theoretic approach to fluctuations located co-ordination failures in
the slowness of interest rates and money wages to respond to swings in the price level, an
argument implying that the maintenance of price stability would prevent their occurrence. Some
of these exponents, for example Fisher, were sufficiently confident of this way of looking at
things that they argued that a price stability rule would be sufficient to guarantee overall
economic stability. Others, for example Hawtrey and those whom he influenced, were more
cautious and were willing to settle for discretionary policy. Furthermore, after the events of
1928-1930 had confirmed that things could nevertheless go badly wrong against a background of
apparently stable inflation, they continued to argue that vigorous monetary expansion would
suffice to prevent a cyclical downturn getting out of hand. Austrian theorists, on the other hand,
stressed the capacity of any monetary expansion to generate forced saving, urged that the
authorities should try to stabilize the level of money expenditure to prevent this happening, and,
took a fatalistic attitude to the consequences of failure. Quantity theorists and Austrians
nevertheless had an important belief in common, namely that malfunctions of the monetary
system, rather than any deeper flaw in the workings of market mechanisms underlay coordination failures, and that appropriate (albeit very different) monetary measures could in
principle prevent them.
In this these two groups differed strongly from those who argued that the very process of
economic growth in a market economy was inherently prone to such failures. These arguments
came in many disguises, ranging from the Pigou-Lavington hypothesis that investment behaviour
was systematically subject to error, to an altogether more thoroughgoing Marxist belief, as
represented, say, by Loewe, in the instability of Capitalism. Commensurate with their playing
down the importance of the monetary system itself as a source of instability, these economists
cast doubt on the sufficiency of any purely monetary cure for such problems, and many of them,
for example the Cambridge economists, including Robertson, and eventually Keynes, advocated
an activist stabilisation policy with a strong fiscal component aimed in particular at dealing with
the consequences of instability in investment.
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Implications for Present Day Monetary Policy
Certain facts of economic history can help us to make tentative choices among these competing
views. To begin with, in their light, it seems unlikely that traditional quantity theoretic
explanations of the cycle tell the whole story. One episode of serious financial instability
occurring without a prior burst of general price inflation, such as that which preceded the Great
Depression, might be written off as an anomaly, but, as was noted at the outset of this paper, we
have seen too much of this recently not to take seriously the possibility that price stability alone
is not a sufficient condition for more general stability. But it seems even less likely that Austrian
analysis tells the whole story either. As was noted earlier, the account of the cycle given by
Mises, Hayek, Robbins et al. treated logical possibilities as logical necessities and seriously
oversold its central message.
But, that being said, inter-temporal co-ordination failures aided and abetted by the
monetary system are both logically possible, and they do seem to happen. Quantity theoretic
models of the cycle certainly have long had room for them to occur when nominal interest rates
fail to keep up with inflation, and hence permit the real market rate of interest to fall short of the
real natural rate. Most speculative bubbles and subsequent collapses do seem to be accompanied
by price level instability. But co-ordination failures also sometimes happen without a burstbof
inflation giving prior warning that something is amiss: how else does one account for all that
surplus office space in the early 1990s, and all that surplus fibre-optic cable in the wake of the
high-tech bubble? When all the over-generalizations are stripped away from Austrian theory,
there still remains a hard core of insight: namely, that discrepancies between the market and
natural rates of interest with a capacity for damaging the real economy can arise even in the
absence of inflation. This insight seems to be valid far beyond Austrian theory’s own narrow and
ideologically drawn boundaries, as Robertson’s work clearly showed, as Robbins later
acknowledged, and as Garrison has more recently reaffirmed. Nor, incidentally, is it obviously
incompatible with a quantity theoretic analysis that is constructed broadly enough to allow
productivity shocks and/or what the Cambridge economists called errors of optimism, to happen
against a tranquil monetary background and independently of the activities of the banking
system.
At first glance, it is hard to resist the conclusion that a monetary regime geared solely
towards generating low inflation is not in and of itself sufficient to guarantee economic stability,
to allow that monetary policy needs to become more ambitious, and perhaps even to concede that
a more generally activist approach to macro-stabilization needs to be re-considered. Some of us,
who remember where policies like that led from the1960s to the 1980s, however, are bound to
resist this last step, and perhaps even the one that precedes it too, and for the present, we can take
some comfort from certain other facts. After all, vigorous monetary expansion, based on the
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central bank’s lender of last resort powers, was not tried after the stock-market collapsed 1929,
nor was such a policy implemented after the Japanese “bubble economy” came to grief in 1991.
Thus, it is not clear from these episodes that a traditional quantity theoretic approach to monetary
policy is inadequate.
At the time of writing, moreover, after the collapse of the high-tech bubble of the late
1990s, the Federal Reserve system does seem to be taking the advice of Hawtrey, Currie,
Friedman and Schwartz, et al. to heart. Perhaps, then, timely monetary expansion will succeed in
staving off stagnation in the U.S., and if it does, then the systematic pursuit of low inflation by
central banks which are also ready to be lenders of last resort when things go wrong in asset
markets, will be a defensible monetary policy regime after all. If it does not, then we shall indeed
have to consider something more ambitious. Here, it is worth recalling that regulatory
frameworks for financial markets that we take for granted nowadays are mainly products of the
1930s and after, and would surely have looked like the creations of “thorough-going Socialists”
to most of Robertson’s readers in 1928. There may be room to deploy these more actively than
has been done in the recent past to stabilise asset markets, when the latter threaten to create
dislocations in the real economy, while continuing to rely on low inflation as the centrepiece of
monetary policy. This would certainly be worth trying, because, if the more generalized
activism, that Robertson and his colleagues so confidently recommended were ever again to reemerge as the alternative of choice to current policies, we could not be nearly as sure as were
they were that it would end up doing more good than harm this time around.
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